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Abstract 
 
Beyond the ordinariness of experience in daily life there are times when we encounter an experi-
ence for which words seem inadequate to express and communicate the experience. The focus of 
my remarks for the first paper will explore this situation of the potential limits of language for 
understanding experience. The question of these limits depends on an analysis of just what takes 
place in experience and (the hermeneutic experience of) language. Drawing on Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory for an answer to the question, I will show just how experience 
and language are interrelated, and, as a result, I will show how the dynamic of language for-
mation expands to accommodate what appears to be inaccessible and inexpressible, while 
allowing experience to sustain its own richness. 
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Presenting the Difficulty 
 
How often have you had an experience, especially one that is deeply profound, after which you 
exclaimed “it so moved me there are no words to say what it means”? Words have failed to take 
hold of the meaning of the experience, and yet, presumably, you do want to speak about it, you 
want to bring it to its understanding, if not to yourself, then to another. Let me give you two 
examples of this kind of experience. The first is an experience of what we would call the sublime. 
My example comes from the philosopher Immanuel Kant. In an essay on our ability to know 
ultimately reality (Kant means here knowledge of God) by reflecting on nature, Kant writes in 
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relation to a microscopic observation of a single drop of water: 
 
When I contemplate the intrigues, the violence, the scenes of commotion in a single par-
ticle of matter, and when from there I direct my gaze upwards to the immeasurable spaces 
of the heavens teeming with worlds as with specks of dust–when I contemplate all this, 
no human language can express the feelings aroused by such a thought; and all subtle 
metaphysical analysis falls far short of the sublimity and dignity characteristic of such an 
intuition. (Kant, 2003, p. 159) 
 
What kind of experience is this really? As a truly sublime experience, it is an experience in 
which what is being presented in it is something literally unpresentable, in this case the intrica-
cies of life and the immeasurable quality of the cosmos. As Kant tells us, the thought of this 
exceeds the ability of thought to comprehend it, where even the feeling aroused by the thought of 
this cannot be captured in language.   
 
So, what is really taking place in this profound experience that is excessive to the point that we 
are at a loss for words? What, in other words, is the precise break that is responsible for language 
failing to achieve its function, which is to express and communicate, not just to others but even 
to ourselves? In the most profound experiences, we see that they are often, if not always, accom-
panied by what the ancient Greeks named as the experience of wonder. Wonder is after all more 
than fascination, and certainly it is not the same as mere curiosity. Modern media wants us to be 
curious, but has little interest in having us be captivated by wonder. Wonder is a deeper phenom-
enon that draws us into the strange and the challenging. The experience of wonder signals a 
certain placelessness with respect to what we are experiencing–a being out of place because we 
cannot go further in our thinking and speaking with the categories of expectation involved in our 
experiencing. As in the Kantian experience of the sublime or any one of those human experienc-
es in which a gap opens between word and feeling, word and expression, we are, in a sense, left 
almost speechless in wonder. Almost speechless, but not totally speechless, for while indeed 
speech may desert us when it comes to articulating a certain experience, such desertion is not 
necessarily evidence of the complete failure of speech, and thus the end of speech. Quite the 
opposite. To be left almost speechless in wonder, one can say, is to be at the opening of thinking 
and speaking. Certainly one can well imagine that in the attempt to communicate a profound 
experience of joy, one wants to say so much that one does not know where to begin.   
 
This experience of the insufficiency of words is not restricted, of course, to experiences of the 
sublime. The second kind of experience like this is more far-ranging. It can be found in not only 
in those deeply personal experiences that range from the traumatic to the blissful, but also in the 
awkward situation of speaking in the face of death. The case of psychological trauma is an 
extreme case in this regard. Trauma is the shattering of an experiential world in such a way that 
there is an unbearable affect. These traumatic affects remain experientially unintegrated. The 
movement toward understanding is not just thwarted, separating a person from the normal flow 
of life, but often times inaccessible. As such, there is an additional difficulty when it comes to 
speaking. Unlike the overpowering thought of the intricate order of life and the cosmos, our 
deeply personal experiences are often inseparable from memory–or better stated, from memo-
ries-in-transition, from the return of experience that is infected with loss. In this memory-in-
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transmission it is especially so that words face the prospect of failing, of not being able to say 
what has been experienced.  
 
But here too, more so than in any experience of the sublime, the prospect of the failing of words 
does not signal the impossibility of speech, but just the opposite. Here I am simply following 
Gadamer. In his words: “The breakdown of language actually testifies to one’s capacity to search 
out an expression for everything . . . . In actuality, speaking has not come to an end but to a 
beginning” (Gadamer, 2007, p. 93).  The issue of the breakdown of speech thus becomes the 
question of where we are to find the words for what we cannot say. Now, the short answer to this 
question is actually quite simple: it is from language itself that we find the words for what we 
cannot say. But this simple answer depends considerably on a certain understanding of the nature 
of language, and along with it, a certain understanding of the intimate relation between language 
and experience. In my remarks that follow, I want to present the hermeneutical account of 
language and experience that will allow us to see the full force of this answer to the question.  I 
will divide my remarks into three parts. 
 
Part 1: Language and Experience from a Hermeneutical Point of View 
 
So first of all, let us put aside a notion of language and of experience that is inadequate for what I 
want to say in this regard. Regarding language, then, our ordinary understanding of language 
seems to be shaped by how we think language works in language acquisition, let us say in a child 
learning words from her mother. As if this were the beginning of language, the mother says the 
word “ball” and rolls the object in front of the child, repeating the association so that the child 
comes to name the object with the word “ball.” One can well imagine more sophisticated exam-
ples of the same phenomenon: a drug company invents a name for a chemical compound because 
the name of the compound by itself would not suffice for the demands of marketing the com-
pound (How do they come up with those names?); or, a computer technician gives the name 
“flash drive” for a newly created devise for media storage. But coining a term or simply giving 
names to objects is not language in its fullest sense. It is not even our basic linguistic relationship 
to words, as if the use of language is at the whim of the user of language, something in front of 
the speaker at his or her disposal like a tool (Gadamer, 2007, p. 105). 
 
Sooner or later, we will run out of nouns and have to use a verb! We will not just utter a word, 
but try to say something in speaking by relating one word to another. Giving names to things is 
not yet discourse where meaning unfolds through the relation of words in combination and play. 
More to the point, what is implied by these examples of naming is that the word functions merely 
as a sign, as the word “ball” is a sign signifying the round object of play for the child. To regard 
language as a system of signs is to assign to language an instrumental character, for the nature of 
a sign is to refer to something beyond itself and thus has no meaning within itself. As signs, 
words are effectively detached from the reality that is being spoken about, a reality that is 
presumably already known. To understand language in this way raises the problem of how 
linguistic instruments can effectively express non-linguistic material. This is the epistemological 
problem that Nietzsche sees with language and that he “solves” by turning this broken connec-
tion into a radical theory of interpretation. A simple physical object such as a leaf, with all its 
sensible particularity, will always be drained of its particularity when translated into words, 
which, ultimately, as the work of concepts, can only convey the general.  In going from the thing 
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to the word, there can only be a dissimulating transference. For Nietzsche, then, words cannot 
say what we experience sensibly and accordingly cannot render intelligible what we see. 
 
How, though, is language to be understood otherwise? To say the least, as Gadamer presents his 
case in Truth and Method a word is not just a sign, but is more like an image (Gadamer, 
1960/1989, p. 416). What he means is that, unlike the arbitrariness of a sign, the word bears a 
deeper connection to the appearance of what is named in the word. But when he says the word is 
more like an image, he is not suggesting that a word is a mere copy of reality in the way some 
think that art copies, or imitates, reality. Gadamer wants to claim that language is not a second 
order presentation: first reality presents itself, then language comes second to re-present the 
reality in words. For Gadamer, who follows Heidegger in this regard, the nature of language is to 
be disclosive of reality, it allows something to show itself, to reveal itself. Such coming to 
appearance is to be understood phenomenologically. What comes to appearance in the word is, to 
use the German word, die Sache, the issue or the matter at issue, the thing that is meant.1 Lan-
guage allows the matter to come to appearance in its understandableness, that is to say, in its 
meaning. Therapeutic conversation illustrates this point very well. The reality of a client’s stress, 
for example, may have produced physical symptoms, but the worldly reality of that stress is 
precisely what is coming to word in the dynamics of speech where there is never simply one 
word.  
 
For Gadamer, this coming to word connects not only thinking and speaking, but also the deep 
accord between word and thing. A person who thinks something–literally, says it to himself–
means by it the thing that he thinks.2  There is no reflection when the word is formed, just as 
there is no consciousness of our speaking when we speak, for the word is expressing the matter 
intended. So Gadamer says, “the starting point for the formation of the word is the substantive 
content that fills the mind” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 426). Whether there are factors that may 
hinder the understanding and the articulation of the intended thing in word, as we see in thera-
peutic conversation, or whether in our human speaking we ever completely say what we mean 
are developments within the enactment of speech that do not affect the principal intention of 
speech. To say this in another way, Gadamer does not think that human speaking must find a 
way to cross a bridge between a wordless world on one side, and a worldless word on the other. 
Our words are worlded from the start; the reality of language is that the world is presented in it.3 
 
Accordingly, for Gadamer language is nothing other than the experience of the world. And what 
then of experience? As experience of the world, it too should be understood accordingly. “Expe-
rience,” Gadamer insists, “is not wordless to begin with only to be made an object of reflection 
by being named by being subsumed under the universal of the word. Rather, experience of itself 
seeks and finds words that express it (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 417). To understand this idea of 
experience requires that we let go of the inadequate idea of experience that Gadamer is rejecting 
here, namely, the idea that experience is a part of knowing, in the same way we think of data. 
Considered in this way, experience is nothing more than a basic component of knowledge that 
completes itself only through an act of reason, that is, in the establishing of patterns and general-
izations from the data of experience. So understood, experience is something to be made availa-
ble to mastery by the act of knowing. It is what is given over to the power of the knowing subject, 
and thus stands within the framework of calculation and repeatability. As data, experience stands 
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in relation to the proposing subject who finds order in the world through reason. When consid-
ered in this way, experience has little to do with language and understanding.   
 
So, against this view, Gadamer holds that experience is actually a more encompassing phenome-
non when we think of it in terms of human experiencing; that is to say, when we consider 
experience as that which we undergo and gain something from. This is experience that is taking 
place in time and is something the individual is involved in. The idea of experience here is 
actually best described by Heidegger. He writes: “To undergo an experience with something, 
means to attain it along the way, by going on a way” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 73). To ask then about 
how the experience of something becomes intelligible, that is to say, to ask how experience can 
be at once an experience of understanding, is to turn to the experience of language. It is to turn to 
language that seeks and finds words for itself. Accordingly, Gadamer says that through language 
“the order and structure of our experience itself is originally formed and constantly changed” 
(Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 457). But this claim that language characterizes our human experience 
of the world is for some quite bold. To defend this claim, which brings us to the very core of 
what Gadamer calls hermeneutic experience, let me turn to my second set of remarks.  
 
Part Two: The Intimate Unity of Language and the Experience of the World 
 
Up to this point I have only been concerned with setting aside certain notions that make it 
difficult to speak about the problem of finding words for our experiences. I wanted to set aside 
the idea that language is simply a system of signs because ultimately this notion robs language of 
its power, a power by which it can expand beyond what appears to be its limit. I also wanted to 
set aside the idea that experience is data because this notion removes experience from the sphere 
of life and language, removes it from the world we inhabit. Following the indications just given, 
let me now expand upon these more positive notions in an attempt to make clear the intimate 
unity of language and the experience of the world. 
 
If we look back at the history of hermeneutic theory, we see that Gadamer was not the first to 
talk about the experience of understanding in relation to the experience of life. We find it already 
in Dilthey, one of the early pioneers of the human sciences, who famously writes that “thinking 
cannot go back behind life.” This means that when we attempt to understand what Dilthey calls 
the “expressions of life,” which include all human thought and action as well as the communica-
tion of experiences, we do so from within life. We understand within the nexus of life. We 
cannot put life-expressions in front of us like an object because of our own involvement in life. 
For Dilthey then, to understand life-expressions, that is, to comprehend living human experience, 
will involve transposing ourselves into the life of another. It involves a re-experiencing the world 
of another. When Gadamer follows the basic outline of this position in his reformulation of the 
hermeneutic circle, which involves relating what is to be understood from our pre-understanding 
in life, he does so by emphasizing that we are not just situated in historical life–at this point 
agreeing with Dilthey that we interpret life from life. Gadamer also says that we are affected by 
historical life whenever we attempt to understand it. We are conditioned by the affects of histori-
cal life, by historical life working on me behind my back, so to speak, which affects the context 
in which we attempt to understand life. Because of this I can never understand life in a free and 
neutral way in an even deeper way than Dilthey thought.  Because of this affection and involve-
ment in life, which Gadamer calls the hermeneutical situation, understanding will always occur 
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as an event–understanding happens or occurs as a result of this involvement and is not produced 
by me in the manner in which we ordinarily say we know something. I am in history when I 
come to understand an event in history. I am already in language when I come to understand the 
meaning of something said. The event of understanding is a moment of the actualization of 
meaning but never can it be the ideal meaning, the one true meaning. As with Dilthey, life is 
intelligible but it is also unfathomable–one does not get to the bottom of it in understanding.  
 
Now, the way that Gadamer will present this unfathomable character of life in its understanding–
what we can simply call our finite comprehension of the world–is through the claim that inter-
pretive understanding unfolds very much like the experience of experience itself. Real experi-
ence, Gadamer tells us, is something I am involved in and occurs only in individual acts. And if 
experiencing is itself a form of knowing, this knowing, obviously so, will emerge from the actual 
encounter with the experienced object in the manner of an event. For Gadamer, this encounter is 
everything, for what is at stake is more than an inductive knowing in which in which we look for 
the constant confirmation of experience. Sooner or later, real experience will refute our expecta-
tion for confirmation. This new experience effectively asserts its own truth against the expecta-
tion from our preliminary or pre-understanding. The new experience amounts to the birth of 
experience as an event over which no one has control, and becomes valid until it is refuted by a 
new experience. With the occurrence of new experience not only does the experienced object 
change–what is experienced is now no longer what it initially was–but also the experiencing 
mind changes as well–I am now different as a result of being experienced.  Since real experience 
can always involve new experience, the process of experience has its fulfillment not in definitive 
knowledge but, as Gadamer says, “in the openness to experience that is made possible by experi-
ence itself” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 355). Thus, Gadamer insists, in being experienced one not 
only recognizes the limits of one’s knowledge, but remains in a state of openness regarding what 
is other. Presumably, a person who takes the experience of experience seriously would be 
naturally inclined to a state of humility.  
 
Hermeneutic experience, and with it the event of understanding, unfolds accordingly. In the 
attempt to understand–whether it be a historical text, a work of art, the words spoken by another 
or even that experience that is strange and challenging–we are not mastering an object, but 
placing ourselves in the open where we encounter the breakdown of our expectations. Being in 
the open is a condition of exposure that is required for letting the meaning that is beyond our 
expectations emerge. It is here that Gadamer also insists on the linguisticality of understanding, 
for it is language that accomplishes this expansion of meaning and understanding of what is 
other. To state the matter succinctly: bringing something into the open is a function of the 
question, and the logic of question and answer, that is to say, conversation or dialogue, becomes 
the structure for understanding. But to say that Gadamer has a dialogical version of hermeneutics 
only tells us one half of the story; it tells us only that understanding is accomplished in the 
communication of meaning with respect to the address of the other which is brought about by the 
question. By itself, this does not tell us enough about the movement of language in dialogue. The 
interplay between conversational partners in dialogue is itself caught up in the interplay that 
language itself is undergoing. This interplay is the movement of language in its possibilizing 
condition. Language is not a stockpile of words but a virtuality of words, which is simply that of 
an open potentiality with respect to the performance of meaning in language. Gadamer describes 
this movement as the speculative dimension of language. The term “speculative” actually comes 
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from 19th century German thought where it was used to convey the way concepts relate to one 
another, as one can begin to see from the root word speculum, to mirror. Language is speculative 
in the sense that the subject matter is “mirrored” in it but not just in a simple way; think of it 
more like a hall of mirrors. Meaning in language is not complete when one simply makes a 
statement; it unfolds, it comes to appearance by thinking further in words. In the speculative 
dimension of language “finite possibilities of the word are oriented to the sense intended as 
toward the infinite” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 469). This coming into word, this enactment of 
meaning that is language, is nothing less than the raising into intelligibility our experiencing of 
the world. It is not the case, then, that something is first understood and then subsequently put 
into words, but rather, we are always seeking and finding words to make ourselves intelligible to 
the other and also to ourselves. In all knowing of the world the moment of understanding has to 
be worked out. 
 
Let me conclude this section of my remarks by emphasizing from what has just been said the 
distinctive dynamic of hermeneutic experience. Two comments: First, to say that the moment of 
understanding has to be worked out means that at least in principle we may not succeed in 
finding words for what we want to say. Despite the overt optimism of Gadamer’s position–an 
optimism that speaks to the fundamental humanism of Gadamer’s position, a point I will make in 
my third talk–there are indeed limits to the communication of meaning. Most notably for Gada-
mer there is the case of translating and understanding poetic texts where the very character of the 
poetic word may make translation and understanding impossible. I am thinking here of Gada-
mer’s analysis of the poetry of Paul Celan, where the opacity of meaning approximates a form of 
hermetic poetry. This limit situation is actually attached to language from the outset. Certainly 
there is the awareness of every speaker in seeking the correct word for what he or she wants to 
say that this word is never completely attained. What has been said in words is always less than 
what is meant, as those deeply personal experiences often attest to. And yet, can we not also say 
that “an unstilled desire for the appropriate word” constitutes the true life and essence of lan-
guage (Gadamer, 2000, p. 17).   
 
And then secondly, let us not forget just how language works. To rephrase Gadamer’s character-
ization of language as speculative, “every word, as the event of a moment, carries with it the 
unsaid to which it is related by responding and summoning” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 458). As 
the (finite) event of the moment the word is not everything and yet “there is laid up within it an 
infinity of meaning to be explicated and laid out” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 458). Every word has 
an inner dimension of multiplication, so that the task of understanding is, to say it once again, to 
find the right word. 
 
Part Three: Finding the Right Word for the Sake of Understanding 
 
To turn then to my final set of remarks, I want to consider here this notion of finding the right 
word. Let me begin here by rephrasing the initial question posed against the acknowledgment 
that words fail. The question is no longer where are we to find the words for what we cannot say, 
but where are we to find the right word for what we cannot at first say. This shift allows us to see 
the real problem for the experience of understanding. If I do not know fully what I want to say 
because the intention of meaning exceeds itself or if the experience I want to convey does not 
have an explicit identity already formed but is shadowy in my own mind, or I am in a dialogue 
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where there is a problem of translation even when we are speaking the same language, then what 
constitutes the right word? What, in other words, constitutes the success of speech and under-
standing? This further question leads us into still more complexities in the experience of under-
standing in language. Let us say, for example, that one of my parents had recently died and I 
wanted to understand my relationship to my parent in a way that I could not have considered 
before. This particular task of understanding would not be so different from the task of under-
standing other things, perhaps even a book that I had read. The success of understanding will 
depend on giving the matter, whether it be the relationship or the meaning in the book, the power 
to speak. This is after all, the central concern for the experience of understanding as conceived 
by Gadamer. What is to be understood should present itself in all its otherness, as if it were a 
new experience, so that it can assert its own truth against my own for-meanings. In the attempt to 
understand my relationship with a parent I begin with an awareness that encompasses conscious 
and unconscious relations which have directions and meanings that I can only vaguely be in 
touch with. My thinking in relation to this awareness brings with it feelings and orientations, the 
latter because it is situated in history. The point here may be obvious: the relation between 
awareness and a thinking that is directed at understanding is not at all similar to the awareness in 
simple act of perception or to the simple recall of memory that we call reminding. In this person-
al experience, but also in the understanding of life in general, the awareness and the thinking are 
inseparable from memory in a deeper sense. Here awareness and thinking are caught up in 
memory-in-transition where they are involved in an elemental forgetting and loss while coming 
to mind. Forgetting and loss are at work in the occurrence of memory in such a way that memory 
enacts not a re-presentation but a recreation as a present happening. Memory, in other words, is a 
transformative occurrence, and thus always a form of interpretation. 
 
It should not be surprising in this context to learn that Gadamer will say at one point that “lan-
guage signifies memory” (Gadamer, 1992, p. 90). But in saying this, the issue is more than 
transformative occurrence since memory is after all a form of preserving. For Gadamer, this 
preserving is not a matter of an unquestioning clinging to what is, as if one could not forget, as if 
one can hold oneself back from the forces of transformation. Rather, in the effort to continually 
renew what we hold to be true, and thus engage in preserving, memory becomes a way of 
confronting ourselves, and this is precisely what language accomplishes. If in our experiencing 
we are caught within the experience of time where all things escape us, living language can bring 
about a recovery from this loss. And what then of my attempt to understand an awareness in 
memory of my parent?  To the extent that my awareness needs understanding, and thus brought 
into the play of language, this play is working at the fringes of identity, caught not just within the 
passing of time but also within an experience of strangeness at the edge of familiarity. The 
experience of understanding is to make this crossing in language from strangeness to familiarity. 
As Gadamer notes, “the true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 
295). As a first approximation to the answer to our question, then, let us say that the right word is 
the word that has made this crossing and is a word that has found its time. 
 
But this word is in some sense not my word; that is to say, it is not a word I possess that I fit into 
the matter to be understood. Rather, in the play of language the word that crosses into familiarity 
is the appropriate word that presents itself in the unfolding of the word’s own naming power. 
And this coming forth of the word brings with it not just meaning, but new meaning in a double 
sense. In one sense, the new meaning comes forth as an addition to my awareness and thus to my 
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experiencing. What comes to understanding was not there in advance in some completed state 
only to be retrieved in recall, but was initially there in the shifting sensibilities of meaning where 
certain associations may interfere with one another. Perhaps what comes to understanding was at 
first glance something on the periphery, not unlike the peripheral meanings that are in play in 
every word. What comes to understanding then amounts to a coming into presentation in which 
there is an “increase in reality.” Gadamer uses this phrase–in German, Zuwachs des Sein–in 
several places. My friend Dennis Schmidt, who is well versed in German wants to translate this 
not as increase but as an intensification of realty. He does so, I think, because of the experience 
of art that is for Gadamer an intensification or a heightening of reality. But the German word 
Zuwachs is clearly a matter of an increase in the sense related to growth. And so, I would say 
that the increase in reality that accompanies hermeneutic understanding is at once an enlarge-
ment of my experience of the world. While indeed it may be for me in the particular example of 
understanding my relationship with my parent that I now see something new, what transpires in 
this play of language, in more general terms, is a “constant building up and bearing within itself 
the communality of world orientation” (Gadamer, 2007, p. 96). In letting my experience speak 
language is at the same time building up an aspect held in common. What is added, then, is not 
simply another opinion about the matter, one more opinion piled on top of others, but, to use 
Gadamer’s words for what takes place in genuine dialogue, “a transformation into a communion 
in which we do not remain what we were” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 379). As a second approxi-
mation to the answer to our question, then, let us say that the right word is the word that comes 
as an increase to meaning. 
 
As to the other sense of new meaning, if it is a new meaning at least in the sense that it leaves 
something behind in us that we have not encountered in the same way before, then we should 
expect that it is a surprising meaning as well.4 This aspect of surprise goes hand in hand with the 
dynamics of language that cannot be reduced to logical calculations. Understanding in language 
does not unfold by moving in strict logical sequence from statement to statement.  It does not 
unfold in a thinking that moves from one thought to another in linear fashion where there can be 
no surprise. Rather, it is a matter of a movement of language in which thinking can also move 
backwards, rephrasing against the particular horizon that is in view, and thus carrying the matter 
forward into other words. When one finds the right word within this dynamic, it is often a word 
unforseen. And as unforseen, the experience of the world that is brought to language, then, is not 
about an event that has happened but is happening. The experience retains its vitality–its life and 
liveliness–in coming to word. The richness of experience thus continues to be brought about by 
language and the experience of understanding. To the question where are we to find the words 
for what we cannot at first say, I would now answer, accordingly, in the evocative power of our 
words in living language–what I think can best be described quite simply as the future of our 
words. 
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Notes 
 
1. See Günter Figal (2002, p. 115), “The Doing of the Thing Itself: Gadamer’s Hermeneutic 
Ontology of Language.”  
 
2. We are always thinking in language and we are already in language when we begin to speak. 
When a child speaks a “first” word it is folly to believe that the parents are witnessing the 
beginning of language. Such a word is always preceded by previous developments, by ex-
changes of looks and gestures, and nascent conversations from within the socialized linguis-
tic world that the child inhabits. The child’s first word is merely an opening into the child’s 
ability-to-talk. See Gadamer (1976, p. 63). 
 
3. Gadamer finds the general frame for this more substantial notion of language in the historical 
Christian idea of the inner word (verbum interius) where the very idea of the word as image 
first emerges. What intrigues Gadamer about this idea is the way in which human speaking is 
conceived in relation to the divine inner word as the source of intelligibility. When Augustine 
speaks of the inner word of God in order to approach the idea of incarnation he is following 
the Stoic distinction between logos endiathetos and the logos prophorikos. This is the distinc-
tion between an indwelling reason and the external word in which the thought dwelling with-
in finds expression. Since the external logos is a secondary process to the internal reflection 
of thought, the external logos is but an imperfect manifestation of the reality. But the peculiar 
character of the Christian “speaking of the Word” does not allow it to be understood exactly 
this way, for in such speaking there is a becoming within this dynamic of language that does 
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not lessen itself by its emergence into exteriority; nor is the Word made flesh–the speaking of 
the Word–to be regarded as a mere appearance of something more essential behind it.   
 
According to Gadamer, here the “miracle of language lies not in the fact that the Word be-
comes flesh and emerges into external being, but that which emerges and externalizes itself 
in utterance is always already a word” (Gadamer, 1960/1989, p. 420). In this idea of the inner 
word the human word is formed in relation to the perfection of thought, but not as a reflective 
act.  In reflection words are formed in a secondary process by turning back to the mind where 
they take hold of a completed thought that comes first. In the idea of the inner word, lan-
guage has already entered thought and the spoken word is caught up in saying the thought; it 
is being formed in relation to the matter of thought. 
 
4. In a sense, this coming forth that is a surprise is how Gadamer speaks about the experience of 
truth in hermeneutics. It is truly remarkable that the title of his major word has truth in the 
title, but there is no explicit discussion of truth as such. Instead, the issue of truth becomes 
the issue of the beautiful, which pertains to the fundamental character of reality to appear in 
its appearance.  
 
 
 
      
 
  
 
 
 
 
